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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The months since the last survey period from June 1, 2009 to May 31,
2010,1 have continued to prove perilous to the nation as well as to the
State of Georgia, as real estate values have plummeted and foreclosure
of real property has reached an all time high.2 However, as this Article
attempts to show, other issues concerning real property abound. As is
the case each year, it is difficult to choose the few cases that may be
surveyed from the numerous decisions affecting real property law. The
cases in this Article were selected either for their legal significance, to
update practicing attorneys, or in some cases to recognize trends.
II.

LEGISLATION

The Speaker's and Lieutenant Governor's gavels struck the block just
before midnight on Thursday, April 29, 2010, signifying the end of the

* Shareholder in the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz,
P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (BA, 1978); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States
Supreme Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty Davis, who year after year has typed
and reviewed this Article. Additional thanks go to Lauren Coleman (University of Georgia
School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2012) who identified every real property case decided during
the survey period; Robert A. "Andy" Weathers, Esq. (Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law, J.D., 1966) whose constant guidance is reflected in the Article; and Carol
V. Clark, Esq., for her assistance, research, and analysis of real property law. Particularly,
the Author directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, 2010 Judicial Update, in REAL PROPERTY
LAW INSTITUTE MATERIALS (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia 2010).
1. For analysis of Georgia real property law during the prior survey period, see Linda
S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 61 MERCER L. REV. 301 (2009).
2. Jon Prior, ForeclosureFilingsHit New Record in 2009: RealtyTrac, HOUSING WIRE
(Jan. 14, 2010, 12:03 a.m.), http//www.housingwire.com/2010/01/14/foreclosure-filingsclimb-another-21-in-2009-realtytrac.
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longest legislative session in Georgia history. The 2010 legislature
reached an agreement on a state budget, a much-touted transportation
bill that some say could ultimately produce private solutions to Atlanta's
traffic gridlock, and an education budget reform bill.' Included in the
myriad of legislation were several bills affecting Georgia real property.
Georgia House Bills 11914 and 1192' each concern the allocation of
certain fees accrued in multijurisdictional real estate transactions.
House Bill 1191 amends section 48-6-69 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.),' which relates to "recording, payment, and
certification where encumbered real property is located in more than one
county or is located within and outside the state."' Specifically, the
amendment provides a method to prorate recording fees in transactions
involving property that lies in several counties or across state lines.8
The formula used to determine the proration is "calculated by applying
the ratio of the value of the real property in such county as it bears to
the total value of the real properties in all counties described in the
instrument to the total tax due."' The value of the property used in the
formula is "calculated pursuant to the most recently determined fair
market valuations of the property as determined by the county board of
tax assessors or comparable assessing entity in any affected state."'o
Likewise, House Bill 1192 relates to payment of real estate transfer
tax in multijurisdictional transactions." Like the amendments to
O.C.G.A. § 48-6-69, this bill provides how tax due on the transaction is
divided among the various counties or states where the property lies.12
The bill amended O.C.G.A. § 48-6-43 to provide that the tax to be paid
shall be prorated among all applicable counties and the amount paid
to the clerk or his or her deputy of the county in which the deed,
instrument, or other writing is recorded shall be that proportion of the
total tax due calculated by applying the ratio of the value of the real

3. Enzo Pastore, Session Roundup: Georgia, PROGRESSIVE STATES NETWORK (June 3,
2010, 11:14 a.m.), http-//www.progressivestates.org/node/26188.
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 1191, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 528 (codified at O.C.GA § 48-6-69(a)
(2010)).
5. Ga. H.R. Bill 1192, Reg. Sass., 2010 Ga. Laws 526 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 48-6-4(e)
(2010)).
6. O.C.G.A. § 48-6-69 (2010).
7. Ga. H.R. Bill 1191, 2010 Ga. Laws 528.
8. Id. at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 528.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Ga. H.R. Bill 1192, 2010 Ga. Laws 526.
12. Id. at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 528.
13. O.C.G.A. § 48-6-4 (2010).
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property in such county as it bears to the total value of the real
properties in all counties described in the deed, instrument, or other
writing to the total tax due,"
The amendments to O.C.G.A. § 48-6-4 also use the county tax assessor's
valuation of the property to determine the proportional amount of
payment."
Georgia Senate Bill 37116 revised certain provisions of the Georgia
Residential Mortgage Fraud Act" and other provisions of the O.C.G.A.
to provide the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) with the authority
to investigate certain offenses involving fraudulent real estate transactions and to give the GBI subpoena power for such investigations.'8
Specifically, the bill amends O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-10419 and 35-3-4, 20 each
of which relates to the power of the GBI. 2' The bill also added O.C.G.A. § 35-3-4.2,2 which authorizes the GBI, with the consent of the
Georgia Attorney General, to issue a subpoena and to compel the
production of documents and computer records.' Should a party fail
to comply with the subpoena, "the director, assistant director, or the
deputy director for investigations, through the Attorney General or
district attorney, may apply to a superior court ...

for an order

compelling compliance."'
III.

TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY

In Simmons v. Community Renewal & Redemption, LLC," the
Georgia Supreme Court analyzed how title vests by adverse possession,
either by expiration of a period of twenty years or by seven years under
color of title." Further, the supreme court analyzed the term "claim of
right" as used in the context of a claim to property and held that the

14. Ga. H.R. Bill 1192 at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 527.
15. Id. at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 527.
16. Ga. S. Bill 371, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 1162 (codified at O.C.GA 00 16-8-104,
35-3-4, -4.2 (Supp. 2010)).
17. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-100 to -106 (2007 & Supp. 2010).
18. Ga. S. Bill 371 at §§ 1-2, 2010 Ga. Laws at 1162.
19. O.C.GA § 16-8-104 (2007 & Supp. 2010).
20. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-4 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
21. Ga. S. Bill 371 at §§ 1-2, 2010 Ga. Laws at 1162.
22. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-4.2 (Supp. 2010).
23. Ga. S. Bill 371 at § 3, 2010 Ga. Laws at 1163.
24. Id.
25. 286 Ga. 6, 685 S.E.2d 75 (2009).
26. Id. at 6, 685 S.E.2d at 77 (quoting Cooley v. McRae, 275 Ga. 435, 436, 569 S.E.2d
845, 846 (2002)); see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-164 (2010).
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term "is synonymous with 'claim of title' and 'claim of ownership." 27
In this matter, Simmons claimed that he owned property based on his
use of it for over twenty years. The problem with Simmons's claim was
that he knew title to the claimed property was vested in Mike Marable.
Nevertheless, Simmons claimed that his use was hostile to Marable's
and consistent with the requirement of the adverse possession statute."
The supreme court held that
[n]o prescription runs in favor of one who took possession of land
knowing that it did not belong to him. Rather, one must enter upon
the land claiming in good faith the right to do so. To enter upon the
land without any honest claim of right to do so is but a trespass and
can never ripen into prescriptive title.2
In other words, Simmons was nothing more than a trespasser, and his
title could "never ripen into prescriptive title by adverse possession."o
In Mann v. Blalock," the supreme court determined that a prior
petition to quiet title under O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-60 to -69n was so
deficient that the order from that 2004 action quieting title could be
voided several years later.' In 2004 Mann filed a quiet title action,
which resulted in an order vesting him, as executor of an estate, with fee
simple title to land. The property later sold for unpaid taxes, and in
2007 the purchaser of the tax deed, Blalock, sought to remove clouds
upon the title, including the order from the 2004 quiet title action. The
matter was heard before a special master who determined that as a
matter of law, Mann's 2004 petition to quiet title was deficient. Relying
on the special master's findings and recommendations, the Superior
Court of Lamar County, Georgia, entered judgment for Blalock, granting
him fee simple title to the land and clearing all clouds from the title.'
The special master found in the 2007 hearing
that the 2004 quiet title proceeding was procedurally deficient as a
matter of law because the petition was not verified as required by
[O.C.G.A.] § 23-3-62(b); it did not include a plat of survey of the land
as required by [O.C.G.A.] § 23-3-62(c); a lis pendens was not filed

27. Simmons, 286 Ga. at 6, 685 S.E.2d at 77.
28. Id. at 6-7, 685 S.E.2d at 77.
29. Id. at 7, 685 S.E.2d at 77 (citations omitted) (quoting Ellis v. Dasher, 101 Ga. 5, 9,
29 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1897); Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 259 Ga. 264, 265, 379 S.E.2d 519,
521 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id.
31. 286 Ga. 541, 690 S.E.2d 375 (2010).
32. O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-60 to -69 (1982).
33. See Mann, 286 Ga. at 543, 690 S.E.2d at 376-77.
34. Id. at 641-42, 690 S.E.2d at 376.
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contemporaneously with the filing of the petition as required by
[O.C.G.A.] § 23-3-62(d); the petition was not submitted to an authorized
special master as required by [O.C.G.A.] § 23-3-63; and the record
fail[ed] to establish service on any party as required by [O.C.G.A.] § 233-65(b)."
The supreme court held that the superior court properly adopted the
special master's findings that Mann never received title from the 2004
action and properly decreed that the judgment from that action should
be removed from the title.'
In Cunningham v. Gage," the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
and his predecessor in interest had fraudulently conveyed property to an
innocent purchaser. The evidence was undisputed that the plaintiffs
obtained a judgment lien against Jeanette Gage, a prior owner, which
was memorialized by a fi. fa. which remained in force at the time of the
suit. Further, it was undisputed that Gage quitclaimed the property to
her brother, Cunningham, for little or no consideration in order to avoid
the judgment lien. Thereafter, Cunningham conveyed the property by
warranty deed to an apparently innocent purchaser. At trial Cunningham moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring the quia timet action. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss, and an appeal ensued.38
In reversing the trial court, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
"[iln order to bring a quia timet action, the plaintiff 'must assert that he
holds some current record title or current prescriptive title. ...
Otherwise, he possesses no title at all, but only an expectancy.'"' The
court of appeals stated that because the plaintiffs did not claim title to
the property at issue, "they ha[d] no standing to maintain a quia timet
action.""o
Another case of note regarding quiet title actions concerns the nature
of the compensation awarded to court-appointed special masters and the
duty of the parties to make that payment. In Davis v. HarpagonCo.,"'
the court of appeals dismissed a party's appeal because the special
master's compensation had not been paid prior to appeal of the trial
court's order." The court noted that such fees "shall be assessed as
35. ld. at 543, 690 S.E.2d at 376.
36. Id. at 543, 690 S.E.2d at 377.
37. 301 Ga. App. 306, 686 S.E.2d 800 (2009).
38. Id. at 307, 686 S.E.2d at 801.
39. Id. at 308, 686 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga.
515, 518, 260 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1979)).
40. Id.
41. 300 Ga. App. 644, 686 S.E.2d 259 (2009).
42. Id. at 644, 646, 686 S.E.2d at 260-61.
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court costs and shall be paid prior to the filing of any appeal from the
judgment of the court.'

In Nelson v. GeorgiaSheriff's Youth Homes, Inc.," the supreme court
addressed the authority vested in the special master upon appointment
by the superior court. In Nelson a special master was appointed
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63 in a quiet title action to land in Troup
County." Two years later, the trial court granted summary judgment
to one of the respondents in the case in "an order which included no
findings of fact or conclusions of law.'
On appeal, the court noted that O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-60 to -69, also known
as the Quiet Title Act of 1966, "sets out 'specific rules of practice and
procedure with respect to an in rem quiet title action against all the
world' that take precedence over the Civil Practice Act when there is a
conflict." The Quiet Title Act requires the trial court to issue an order
appointing the special master and requires the special master to make
findings and report them to the trial court." After being appointed,
the special master
shall have complete jurisdiction within the scope of the pleadings to
ascertain and determine the validity, nature, or extent of petitioner's
title and all other interests in the land ... or to remove any particular
cloud or clouds upon the title to the land and to make a report of his
findings to the judge of the court. 9
However, the appointment of a special master does not divest the trial
court of its overall jurisdiction of the case, and the court retains its
authority to issue the final order determining title to the real property
in dispute.o
The court of appeals acknowledged that under the Civil Practice
Act (CPA)," a superior court has the authority "to grant a motion for
summary judgment without setting forth findings of fact and conclusions
of law," but the court of appeals stated that the procedures set out in the

43. Id. at 646, 686 S.E.2d at 261; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-7-22(c) (2007).
44. 286 Ga. 192, 686 S.E.2d 663 (2009).
45. Id. at 192, 686 S.E.2d at 663-64. Under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63, the court is required
to submit the petition and other filed instruments to a special master.
46. Nelson, 286 Ga. at 192, 686 S.E.2d at 664.
47. Id. (quoting Woodruff v. Morgan Cnty., 284 Ga. 651, 652, 670 S.E.2d 415, 416
(2008)).
48. Id. at 192-93, 686 S.E.2d at 664; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-63, -66.
49. Nelson, 286 Ga. at 193, 686 S.E.2d at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also O.C.GA. § 23-3-66.
50. Nelson, 286 Ga. at 193, 686 S.E.2d at 664; see also O.C.GA. § 23-3-67.
51. O.C.GA tit. 9, ch. 11 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
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Quiet Title Act that require the special master to make factual findings
and report them to the court take precedence over the conflicting
requirement of the CPA." Because the trial court's order did not
reflect the special master's findings of fact, and because the trial court
made an adjudication without its own findings, the case was remanded
for the trial court to include findings of the special master or the trial
court.63
Recording a lis pendens is an important tool for giving notice to
prospective purchasers that real property is involved in litigation and
that the relief sought in the suit involves the particular property."
The flipside of a lis pendens is that this notice also makes real property
virtually unmarketable. In Meadow Springs, LLC v. IH Riverdale,
LLC,"3 the supreme court considered whether "a right of first refusal
to invest in development of real estate through a limited liability
company is an interest sufficient for the filing of a lis pendens"'
A company's operating agreement was the subject of the suit before
the supreme court. Riverdale Capital Investments, LLC (Riverdale
Capital), was composed of two members-McChesney Capital Partners,
LLC and IH Riverdale, LLC (IH Riverdale). Riverdale Capital was
created for the sole purpose of acquiring separate tracts of land and
developing two apartment complexes on that land. Both complexes
would be called "Meadow Springs Apartments," the first to be built as
The operating agreement
"Phase I" and the second as "Phase IL"
"also provided that the Phase II development was 'referred to in Section
Section 5.11(e) of the operating agreement provided
5.11(e) hereof."
that McChesney Capital Partners, having an option to buy the Phase II
land, would allow "IH Riverdale 'the first right of refusal to invest' [for]
Phase II." The operating agreement further stated that
"[i]f IH elects to invest, IH shall have the right to invest from twentyfive percent up to fifty percent of the capital and receive its proportionate share of profits and losses," and that "[iun the event that [Riverdale
Capital Investments] elects to sell the Option or 'flip' the Second Phase
land for profit," IH Riverdale would be entitled to [forty] percent of the
profit.63
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Nelson, 286 Ga. at 193, 686 S.E.2d at 664.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. I 44-14-610 (2002).
286 Ga. 701, 690 S.E.2d 842 (2010).
Id. at 701, 690 S.E.2d at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701-02, 690 S.E.2d at 843 (alterations in original).
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At the time of the supreme court's review of the case, Meadow Springs,
LLC, (Meadow Springs) owned the Phase II development.e"
IH Riverdale and Geoffrey Nolan, a member of IH Riverdale,
commenced this action by filing a complaint against Meadow Springs,
alleging that Meadow Springs deprived IH Riverdale of its first right of
refusal to invest in the Phase II land.' IH Riverdale requested specific
performance of the option to purchase 50% of the Phase II land and "the
imposition of a constructive trust on the land and profits of that
development."' IH Riverdale later recorded a notice of lis pendens
that informed the court of the relief it sought concerning Phase H and
delivered a copy of the notice to Regions Bank, which subsequently
refused to fund the approved construction loan."
In January 2005, Meadow Springs filed an action against IH Riverdale
and Nolan, seeking damages for slander of title and other torts arising
from the filing of the lis pendens and its delivery to Regions Bank.6
The trial court addressed the issue of "whether IH Riverdale's 2003
action 'involved' the real property within the meaning of the lis pendens
statute, [O.C.G.A.] § 44-14-610."6 The trial court determined that the
parties' operating agreement granted IH Riverdale and Nolan "a right
of first refusal to invest in Phase II," and concluded that if Riverdale was
successful in its claim, a trust could be placed on the Phase II land.'
Therefore, the trial court held that the 2003 lawsuit "involved" the
property, which in turn made the filing of the lis pendens proper.s
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that IH
Riverdale's action "involved" the property within the meaning of
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610 and that the lis pendens was valid." However,
the court of appeals noted that Nolan only had a right to invest in the
property's development, not an option to purchase the land."o The
court then concluded that it "could not 'say that as a matter of law IH
and Nolan would not be entitled to any equitable relief with respect to
the property.'"'

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 702, 690 S.E.2d at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702, 690 S.E.2d at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 702-03, 690 S.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 702, 690 S.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 702-03, 690 S.E.2d at 844.
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In determining whether the court of appeals erred in its ruling, the
supreme court conducted an exhaustive review of the meaning of the
word "involved" as used in the lis pendens statute.72 The supreme
court concluded that "[real property is 'involved' in litigation within the
meaning of the lis pendens statute 'only [if it is] actually and directly
brought into litigation by the pleadings in a pending suit and as to
which some relief is sought respecting that particular property.'"" A
plaintiff's direct interest in real estate will often support legal relief
against the property and can be enough for a court to determine that a
lis pendens is valid." For example, a plaintiff could obtain relief such
as cancellation of a deed or specific performance." However, a lis
pendens can still be valid even if a plaintiff does not have a direct
interest in the real property "so long as the real property would be
directly affected by the relief sought."
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court found that the
case was controlled by the rationale of Hill v. L/A Management Corp.,77
which the court of appeals had not considered. In Hill the plaintiff
filed a notice of lis pendens against real estate owned by a partnership,
claiming that the defendants denied him his right to invest in that real
estate. The plaintiff in that case was only entitled to his pro rata share
of the partnership profits because his partnership interest constituted
personalty rather than realty.79 The supreme court, in Hill, further
explained that "if the plaintiff ultimately prevailed in the litigation, he
would obtain damages and an interest in the partnership, but not a
direct interest in the realty, which also would not be directly affected by
that relief."' Ultimately, the conclusion in Hill was that Hill's interest
in personalty did not grant him relief against that property and that the
lis pendens was invalid."
In applying Hill to the present case, the supreme court held that the
trial court and the court of appeals correctly determined that the option

72. Id. at 703, 690 S.E.2d at 844.
73. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. IVA Mgmt. Corp., 234 Ga. 341,
342-43, 216 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Moore v. Bank of Fitzgerald, 266 Ga. 190, 465 S.E.2d 445 (1996)
(obtaining cancellation of deed); Walker v. Houston, 176 Ga. 878, 169 S.E.2d 107 (1933)
(obtaining specific performance)).
76. Id.
77. 234 Ga. 341, 216 S.E.2d 97 (1975).
78. Meadow Springs, 286 Ga. at 703, 690 S.E.2d at 844.
79. Id. (citing Hill, 234 Ga. at 341-43, 216 S.E.2d at 97-99).
80. Id. at 703-04, 690 S.E.2d at 844 (citing Hill, 234 Ga. at 343, 216 S.E.2d at 99).
81. Id. at 704, 690 S.E.2d at 844-45 (citing Hill, 234 Ga. at 343, 216 S.E.2d at 99).
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of first right of refusal to invest granted III Riverdale the right to invest
in development of the real estate but did not grant any right to actual
ownership of that realty.8 2 The supreme court held that because IH
Riverdale had merely an interest in personalty, not in real estate, the lis
pendens was improper because such an interest "doles] not constitute
relief against the land."'
IV.

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

Each year the appellate courts remind attorneys and all those involved
in real estate transactions about the importance of valid legal descriptions both in contracts and as a means to attack the validity of a
contract or recorded instrument. In Oconee Land & Timber, LLC v.
Buchanan,' the court of appeals provided a written reminder of the
importance of an accurate legal description, and declared that a legal
description can be used as a tool in bringing or defending suit."
Oconee Land & Timber, LLC (Oconee Land), brought suit against
Ren6 Buchanan. The complaint sought specific performance of a
contract between the parties for the sale of real property or money
damages for breach of the contract. With cross-motions for summary
judgment before it, the trial court ruled for Buchanan, concluding that
the contract was unenforceable because it lacked a legally sufficient
description of the property for sale. Oconee Land appealed the trial
court's judgment."
According to the evidence, Buchanan owned approximately 136 acres
in Pulaski County, Georgia. From 1996 to 2000, Buchanan leased the
property to WLD Farms, Inc. (WLD Farms) for ninety dollars per acre,
and she granted WLD Farms a right of first refusal if Buchanan ever
sold the property." In August 2007, Buchanan entered into a written
contract with Oconee Land, under which she "agree[d] to sell '[all that
tract of land lying and being in Land Lot 267 of the 12[thl, District ...
of Pulaski County, Georgia[, ... 31036 .. . as recorded in Plat Book see,
Page Ex. A' for $272,240."'
There were no exhibits attached to the contract, which provided that
the closing would be held on or before September 25, 2007. Buchanan
later contacted WLD Farms, at which point WLD Farms, in exercising

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 704, 690 S.E.2d at 845.
Id.
300 Ga. App. 853, 686 S.E.2d 452 (2009).
See id. at 855-56, 686 S.E.2d at 454.
Id. at 853-54, 686 S.E.2d at 453.
Id. at 854, 686 S.E.2d at 453.
Id. (first and second alterations in original).
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its right of first refusal, made a verbal offer on the property that
exceeded Oconee Land's offer by $500 per acre. After Oconee Land
learned of the lease between WLD Farms and Buchanan, Oconee Land
expressed to WLD Farms that it intended to enforce its contract with
Buchanan to purchase the property. WLD Farms responded by offering
to buy the property from Oconee Land after its purchase for $500 more
per acre than WLD Farms would have paid Buchanan. Oconee Land
rejected the offer, indicating that it did not intend to sell the property
after purchasing it from Buchanan. After Oconee Land bought the land
from Buchanan, however, it contracted to sell the property to Joe
Meadows. Oconee Land sued Buchanan after she failed to appear for
the closing of Oconee Land's sale of the property to Meadows."
The court of appeals began its analysis of the trial court's decision by
reviewing the requirements under the statute of frauds for a contract for
the sale of land.' The court first noted the requirement that a contract
for the sale of land must be in writing and must provide a sufficiently
definite description of the property to be sold.9 1 b meet this requirement, the "contract must describe the property to be sold with the same
degree of certainty as that required in a deed conveying realty.' The
court also noted that parol evidence can be admitted to supplement a
contract description when it is legally insufficient.'

Next, the court further reviewed when extrinsic evidence may be
admitted, stating that
[a] requirement for the admission of extrinsic evidence, however, is
that the premises are so referred to within the contract as to indicate
the seller's intention to convey a particular tract of land. Under those

circumstances, the descriptive language in the contract functions as a
"key" that opens the door to parol evidence, and such evidence is
admissible to show the precise location and boundaries of such tract.
Conversely, if the land is so imperfectly and indefinitely described in
the contract that no particular tract or lot is designated, parol evidence
is not admissible to supply a description."
The court held that the purchase agreement failed to describe the
property with sufficient certainty and did not contain a "key" that would

89. Id. at 854-55, 686 S.E.2d at 453.
90. Id. at 855, 686 S.E.2d at 454.
91. Id.

92. Id. (quoting McClung v. Atlanta Real Estate Aquisitions, 282 Ga. App. 759,762,639
S.E.2d 331, 334 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 855-56, 686 S.E.2d at 454.
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have allowed the admission of extrinsic evidence.'
the court hesitated to use such a key, stating that

Most importantly,

the idea of a "key" has been overworked, and it has certainly been
frequently misunderstood. There need not be confusion about this
word, and no confusion will result if the word is given its true and
literal meaning. A metallic bar is a key only when it serves the
purpose of unlocking the door, and is not a key if it fails in its primary
purpose, which is to unlock the door. Likewise any descriptive words
in a contract for the sale of land, which will lead unerringlyto the land
in question, constitute the key which the law contemplates. But no
amount of words in such a contract which fail to lead definitely to the
land therein will constitute a key. If such words, when aided by

extrinsic evidence, fail to locate and identify a certain tract of land, the
description fails and the instrument is void."
V.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BouNDARIEs

In Gibson v. Rustin," the court of appeals reviewed the rules set out
in the Georgia statute for determining disputed boundary lines. The
dispute in Gibson concerned the exact position of the boundary line
between the northeast and southeast corners of Rustin's property, which
was purchased from Whelchel in 1965. The deed to the land referenced
a 1965 survey that described Rustin's property as taken from a plat
drawn by a surveyor. The plat did not show any landmarks or
monuments except for a spring to the east of the property. According to
the plat, two land lot corners and two disputed points on the southeastern and northeastern corners established the four corners of Rustin's
property.8
Rustin resurveyed the property in 2003 and found a closure failure of
twelve feet missed in the earlier survey. The new survey also determined that the metes and bounds on the deed's description of Rustin's
property did not match the calls on the plats." A dispute arose
concerning Rustin's right to build a fence and the Gibsons' right to
maintain a garden on the land. As a result, Rustin filed a quiet title
petition to remove cloud from his title, and filed for trespass and
ejectment against the Gibsons."
In response, the Gibsons and the

95. Id. at 856, 686 S.E.2d at 454.
96. Id. at 856-57, 686 S.E.2d at 454-55 (quoting Blumberg v. Nathan, 190 Ga. 64, 6566, 8 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. 297 Ga. App. 169, 676 S.E.2d 799 (2009).
98. Id. at 170, 676 S.E.2d at 801.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 172, 676 S.E.2d at 802.
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other affected landowners "filed a petition against Rustin to remove
cloud from their [respective] title[s], establish a boundary line, and for
ejectment."' 0 The two cases were eventually consolidated.' 2
At a bench trial, the trial court found for Rustin and erjoined the
Gibsons from trespassing on the property.'o On appeal, the Gibsons
contended that the trial court's determination of the boundary line was
not properly supported by the evidence.'
Upholding the trial court,
the appellate court reviewed O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5,'0o which sets out the
general rules for determining disputed boundary lines."c The court
noted that under § 44-4-5, evidence offered to show the presence of
natural landmarks is most conclusive in determining disputed boundary
lines, and "[aincient or genuine landmarks such as corner stations or
marked trees . . . control the course and distances called for by the

survey."' 7 The statute also instructs the fact finder on how to
determine boundary lines in the absence of higher evidence or when the
corners are established, but the lines are not marked."o
In Hitch v. Vasarhelyi,'" the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals decision that the Hitches had no standing to bring suit against
government entities that had issued his neighbor a permit to build a
dock."o At the time the suit was filed, the dock was not yet built. The
State of Georgia, the Department of Natural Resources, and the Coastal
Resources Division issued a permit to Vasarhelyi to build a dock
extending over state-owned tidewater beds and marshlands."' The
Hitches "sought ... a declaratory judgment to determine whether the
issuance of a dock permit 'impacting the property and property value of
an adjacent landowner is subject to the provisions of the Administrative
Procedures Act,' as well as . .. other relief."" 2
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court found that to
prove standing to object to government action, "a landowner must
demonstrate a substantial interest in the government action and show
that this interest is in danger of suffering a special damage or injury not

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 173, 676 S.E.2d at 802.
Id. at 176, 676 S.E.2d at 804.
O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5 (2010).
Gibson, 297 Ga. App. at 176, 676 S.E.2d at 804; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5.
Gibson, 297 Ga. App. at 176, 676 S.E.2d at 804.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5.
285 Ga. 627, 680 S.E.2d 411 (2009).
Id. at 627, 680 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 627-28, 680 S.E.2d at 412.
Id. at 627, 680 S.E.2d at 412.
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common to all property owners similarly situated."" 3 Property owners
can show substantial interest by demonstrating a diminution in the
value of their property and including evidence that there would be visual
intrusions, traffic issues, and the like, although special damages are not
limited to economic loss alone."" The court held that even though the
dock had not been completed, the Hitches had standing as landowners
and were not required to wait until a structure was built before seeking
relief."' Additionally, the supreme court held that the court of
appeals had "misapplied the concept of speculative or contingent
injuries..us According to the court of appeals, any damages that the
Hitches might incur were speculative because the permit to build the
dock did not relieve Vasarhelyi from complying with other laws
protecting the rights of those affected by the dock."' The supreme
court, however, determined that it was the issuance of the license itself
that enlarged Vasarhelyi's rights to the detriment of the Hitches.1 '
The supreme court concluded that the Hitches would suffer special
damages because the construction of Vasarhelyi's dock would affect the
view from the Hitches' property, limit their own ability to build a dock,
and diminish the value of their property.u
Dissenting, Justice Carley opined that the majority opinion was in
error because the Hitches' injury was not caused by the permit allowing
construction, and injury would only accrue once the dock was built.'20
Justice Carley argued that the Hitches "would not have a right of action
against a private party who merely permitted construction on its own
adjoining property, at least so long as the structure did not constitute a
HUSRCO121
"2
nuisance.

An easement that granted a family access to a cemetery was at issue
in Davis v. Overall.'22 Davis, Farmer, and other family members had
continuously maintained a family cemetery since the burial of six
relatives. Accessing the cemetary was not an issue until 2007 when the
property on which the cemetary was located was sold to Richard Overall.
Davis called Overall when he learned that the property had been sold,

113. Id at 628, 680 S.E.2d at 412.
114. Id. at 628, 680 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Moore v. Maloney, 253 Ga. 504, 506, 321
S.E.2d 335, 337 (1984)).
115. Id. at 629, 680 S.E.2d at 413.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 629-30, 680 S.E.2d at 413-14.
120. Id. at 631, 680 S.E.2d at 415 (Carley, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 631, 680 S.E.2d at 414.
122. 301 Ga. App. 4, 686 S.E.2d 839 (2009).
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but Overall stated that he knew nothing about the cemetery and forbade
the family from coming onto his property. Davis then retained an
attorney, who wrote Overall a letter explaining that the family had the
right to cross Overall's property to access the cemetery and a right to
maintain it. Overall responded by cluttering the cemetery and the
adjacent land with debris and building materials. Davis and Farmer
brought suit against Overall for interfering with the easement, for
trespass, and for nuisance. Shortly after suit was filed, Overall's
attorney informed the family that they could access the cemetery.
However, when the family visited the property, they found that Overall
allowed goats and large dogs to roam freely across the cemetery
property, which they purported constituted a continuing nuisance and
trespass.'23 The trial court granted Davis and Farmer a permanent
easement to access the cemetery but granted summary judgment to
Overall on the plaintiffs' claims of nuisance, trespass, punitive damages,
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. Davis and
Farmer appealed.'
In holding that the trial court erred in granting Overall's motion for
summary judgment on the claims of nuisance and trespass, the court of
appeals first looked to the law that pertains specifically to family burial
plots." The court explained that
[w]hen a family burial plot is established, it creates an easement
against the fee, and while the naked legal title will pass, it passes
subject to the easement created.... The easement and rights created
thereunder survive until the plot is abandoned either by the person
establishing the plot or his heirs, or by removal of the bodies by the
person granted statutory authority.'28

Therefore, the court held that since Davis and Farmer were heirs of
the person who established the cemetery, they had a right to enter, care
for, and maintain the burial plots and to use and enjoy the family
cemetery property.' 7 The court also held that Davis and Farmer were
entitled to recover damages from Overall because allowing the animals
to roam on the property and piling refuse in and around the cemetery
property interfered with the family's right to use and enjoy the

123. Id. at 5, 686 S.E.2d at 841.
124. Id. at 4, 686 S.E.2d at 840-41.
125. Id. at 5, 686 S.E.2d at 841.
126. Id. (quoting Walker v. Ga. Power Co., 177 Ga. App. 493, 495, 339 S.E.2d 728, 730
(1986)).
127. Id. at 5-6, 686 8.E.2d at 841 (quoting Walker v. Ga. Power Co., 177 Ga. App. 493,
495, 339 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1986)).
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property." Whether the damages were nominal was a question for
the jury." On the issue of punitive damages, the court held that the
trial court erred in granting Overall summary judgment because
damages flowed directly from the interference with a property right."
VI.

TRESPASS AND NuISANCE

In Adams v. Georgia Power Co.,"ax a property owner brought a suit
against Georgia Power Company (GPC), seeking several remedies,
including "damages for trespass . . ., a declaratory judgment that GPC
lacked rights to occupy or enter his property, and an injunction
prohibiting GPC from entering or occupying his property in the
future."s3 2 In 1953 GPC entered into a twenty-five year lease with the
property owner's predecessor that authorized GPC to install and operate
power lines across the property. During the term of the lease, GPC was
to pay $34.25 per year. Although the lease was recorded, GPC had no
records to show that the payments had been made or to show that the
lease had been renewed after its expiration in 1978. It was undisputed
that GPC installed poles on the property and used the poles for power
lines from at least 1991 through 2002. When Adams bought the
property in 1999, the property still contained the original utility poles
installed by GPC. In 2006, as part of a planned upgrade to the lines,
GPC offered to pay Adams to update the easement over the property.
The parties did not reach an agreement, and GPC moved the existing
line from the poles on Adams's property, while leaving the wooden poles
themselves in place. The new power line passed over Adams's property,
which he purported constituted trespass. The trial court granted GPC
summary judgment, and Adams appealed, arguing that the trial court
erred when it ruled that GPC had acquired an easement by prescripHowever, the court of appeals held that Adams was not
tion."
entitled to relief because the applicable statute of limitations had
expired.' 3
The trial court and the court of appeals relied upon Webster v.

Snapping Shoals Electric Membership Corp.,'

which held that a

landowner's right to bring a trespass action against an electric company

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 6, 686 S.E.2d at 841.
See id. at 6, 686 S.E.2d at 841-42.
Id. at 6, 686 S.E.2d at 842.
299 Ga. App. 399, 682 S.E.2d 650 (2009).
Id. at 400, 682 S.E.2d at 651.
Id.
Id. at 401, 682 S.E.2d at 652.
176 Ga. App. 265, 335 S.E.2d 637 (1985).
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was governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30,'" which provides a four-year
statute of limitation for actions for trespass or damage to realty. 37
Here, Adams was on notice of the power lines because the lease was
recorded and because the lines existed on the property at the time of his
purchase." Therefore, the statute of limitations barred Adams from
bringing the trespass action because he filed it more than four years
after his 1999 purchase date. 39
Adams also argued that the trial court erred in granting judgment to
GPC on his claim for exclusive title to the property and in refusing to
enjoin GPC from operating or maintaining the power line across his
property.'40 In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held that
Adams waived his sole remedy for damages because he did not timely
file suit pursuant to the four-year statute of limitations provided in
The court of appeals stated,
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30.'
If a landowner stands by and permits, without legal objection, a public
utility company to appropriate his land to its necessary corporate use
until such becomes a necessary and constituent part of its service to
the public, and the rights of the public intervene to such extent that to
oust the company would interrupt the service and deny it to the public,
the landowner, not for the protection so much of the company but for
the benefit of the public, will be estopped from recovering the land in
ejectment or from enjoining its use for the service, but will, if he moves
in time, be remitted to an appropriate action for damages.""
Although it was not the primary inquiry on appeal, in City ofAtlanta
v. Eleber,4 s the supreme court explained the difference between a
permanent nuisance and a continuing nuisance in the context of the
The homeowners in that case
applicable statute of limitations."
brought an action for negligence and nuisance against the City of
Atlanta (City) and a railroad company, claiming that the City and the
railroad company did not adequately maintain a drainage pipe and
culvert situated near the homeowners' property, which caused flooding
during heavy rains. Over the span of many years, the railroad company
136. O.C.G.A.

I 9-3-30 (2007).

137. Adams, 299 Ga. App. at 400-01, 682 S.E.2d at 651 (citing Webster, 176 Ga. App.
at 267, 335 S.E.2d at 640); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30.
138. Adams, 299 Ga. App. at 401, 682 S.E.2d at 651.
139. Id. at 401, 682 S.E.2d at 651-52.
140. Id. at 401, 682 S.E.2d at 652.
141. Id. at 401-02, 682 S.E.2d at 652.
142. Id. at 402, 682 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting Waldrop v. Ga. Power Co., 233 Ga. 851, 853,
213 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. 285 Ga. 413, 677 S.E.2d 134 (2009).
144. Id. at 416, 677 S.E.2d at 137.
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installed railroad tracks, a culvert, and a thirty-six-inch drainage pipe
on the property that would eventually be owned by the homeowners. At
the time they were installed, at least four decades ago, the culvert and
pipe could adequately drain the basin where the property sat. However,
by the time the homeowners purchased the property in the summer of
1997, heavy rains consistently resulted in damage to the property from
flooding. The homeowners requested that the City and the railroad
company ameliorate the flooding. Receiving no response, the homeowners brought suit against the City and the railroad company for negligence and nuisance.'a
Based on the findings of a special master,""s the trial court granted
summary judgment to the City and the railroad company on the ground
that the applicable statute of limitations had expired. In reversing the
trial court, the court of appeals determined that the nuisance was
continuing in nature and therefore was not barred by the four-year
statute of limitations. The case was then appealed to the supreme court.
The issues on appeal were whether the court of appeals erred when it
concluded that the homeowners presented triable negligence and
nuisance claims against the railroad company and whether the
homeowners presented a triable nuisance claim against the City."'
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals determination
that the nuisance at issue was continuous in nature, noting that such a
determination directly controls how the statute of limitations will be
applied to the nuisance claim."4 s The supreme court stated that the
damage or destruction caused by "[a] nuisance, permanent and
continuing in its character . . . gives but one right of action, which

accrues immediately upon the creation of the nuisance, and against
which the statute of limitations begins ... to run." 49 On the other
hand, the supreme court explained that
[wihere a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is one which
can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it,
every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh
action will lie. This action accrues at the time of such continuance,

145. Id. at 413-14, 677 S.E.2d at 135-36.
146. Id. at 415, 677 S.E.2d at 136.
147. Id. at 413, 677 S.E.2d at 135.
148. Id. at 415-16, 677 S.E.2d at 136-37.
149. Id. at 416,677 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga.
724, 727, 28 S.E. 994, 994 (1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and against it the statute of limitations runs only from the time of such
accrual.so

Under this standard, the court held that the statute of limitations
barred the homeowners' claim that the mere presence of the culvert and
pipe created a nuisance because that claim was permanent in nature."'1 However, the statute of limitations did not bar the homeowners' claim that the culvert and pipe had not been properly maintained
because that claim was continuous in nature.'5 2
VII. FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY

In Colbert v. Branch Banking & 'Dust Co.,"a a borrower brought
suit against his mortgage lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that
the lender had failed to properly notify him of foreclosure proceedings
Colbert owned property in
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a).'
Springfield, Georgia, on which he established a $175,000 mortgage loan.
The property lacked a mailbox, and Colbert designated P.O. Box 1380 as
his address for purposes of the notice provision of the mortgage loan. In
2003 Colbert began using his Laurel Street business address instead of
the P.O. Box, and he implemented a change of address with the U.S.
Postal Service and notified the bank of the change by telephone.
Although Colbert did not notify the bank in writing of his change of
address, he received mail from the bank at the Laurel Street address
concerning certain tax issues. When Colbert filed for bankruptcy in
2004, he designated his Laurel Street address as his mailing address for
purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings. The bank was identified as a
creditor of Colbert's, and provided with the Laurel Street address during
the bankruptcy process. Colbert defaulted in making his mortgage
payments and, after receiving stay relief from the bankruptcy court in
2008, the bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. To notify Colbert of
the foreclosure, the bank sent notice of the sale by certified mail with a
return receipt requested to the P.O. Box address designated in the loan
documents. The bank also published notice of foreclosure sale in the
Effingham Herald. In February 2009, consistent with the notice and
publication, the bank foreclosed the property selling it to Martion T.
Lanier III and executed a deed under power of sale. A deed under power

160. Id. (quoting City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724, 727, 28 S.E. 994,
994 (1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 416-17, 677 S.E.2d at 137.
152. Id. at 417, 677 S.E.2d at 137.
153. 302 Ga. App. 687, 691 S.E.2d 598 (2010).
154. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a) (Supp. 2010).
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evidencing the sale and transfer of title to the Springfield property was
recorded. After Colbert learned of the foreclosure, he asked the superior
court to void the sale and provide him with injunctive relief. The
superior court denied Colbert's request, and Colbert appealed."
It was not disputed that Colbert defaulted on repayment of the
mortgage loan and that the bank had the power to foreclose on the
property. Rather, Colbert disputed the superior court's conclusion that
the bank gave proper notice of the foreclosure sale under O.C.G.A. § 4414-162.2(a).'" In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals first
looked to the relevant requirements of the statute:
Notice of the initiation of proceedings to exercise a power of sale in a
mortgage, security deed, or other lien contract shall be given to the
debtor by the secured creditor no later than 30 days before the date of
the proposed foreclosure. Such notice shall be in writing ... and shall
be sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery,
return receipt requested, to the property address or to such other
address as the debtor may designate by written notice to the secured
creditor.15 7

The court of appeals noted that two essential facts were undisputed:
the bank sent notice of the foreclosure sale to Colbert's post office box,
and Colbert designated the P.O. Box as his mailing address in the loan
At the hearing, Colbert admitted that he used his
documents."
Laurel Street address as the return address when mailing loan
payments to the bank but never gave the bank written notice of his
address for purposes of the loan."' The court further noted that
rather than provide the bank with written notice, Colbert gave oral
notice of the change over the telephone, resulting in the bank sending
some correspondence to the Laurel Street address." According to the
court, Georgia case law is well settled that none of Colbert's actions
could satisfy his obligation to give the bank written notice of his change
of address.' 6 ' Not even the bank's actual notice of the change could
In order to designate a change of address
meet that obligation."
under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a),

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Colbert, 302 Ga. App. at 687-88, 691 S.E.2d at 598-99.
Id. at 688, 691 S.E.2d at 599.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a).
Colbert, 302 Ga. App. at 688, 691 S.E.2d at 599.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688-89, 691 S.E.2d at 599.
Id.
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[tihe plain language of the statute requires that the debtor designate
in writing another address to the secured creditor. A telephone call, a
notation on a file by an employee of [the Bank], and the receipt of
payment by checks [or envelopes] with the new address, do not show
compliance with the requirement that [the debtor] designate an
address by "written notice.""s
In light of economic conditions during the survey period that have
resulted in the devaluation of real property, Greenwood Homes, Inc. v.
Regions Bank" provides a timely opinion on how commercial or
multifamily property may be valued for foreclosure sale and subsequent
confirmation of the foreclosure." In Greenwood Homes, the appraiser
testified about his use of a "sales comparison approach" and "discounted
First, the
cash flow" analysis to determine the property's value.'
appraiser determined the retail value of the property by comparing it to
In selecting comparable properother properties of similar value."
ties, the appraiser looked only at property sold in "bulk sale transactions," which were comprised of groups of townhome lots sold together.1" The appraiser also considered the "absorption rate" of the
properties-that is, the rate at which the lots would sell over a span of
time." After he studied the demand for these comparable properties,
the appraiser determined that the subject property's demand would not
mature until after a twelve-month holding period. Taking into account
the deferred demand for townhome lots, the appraiser determined the
present market value of the property using a discounted cash flow
analysis.7 o
The appellant argued that the appraiser's methodology failed to
comply with O.C.GA. § 44-14-161(b), which requires that the property
The appellant particuforeclose for at least its true market value.'
larly disputed the appraiser's use of a bulk sales methodology that

163. Id. at 689, 691 S.E.2d at 599 (alterations in original) (quoting Zeller v. Home Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 220 Ga. App. 843, 845, 471 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1996)).
164. 302 Ga. App. 591, 692 S.E.2d 42 (2010).
165. See generally O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(b) (2002) (The court shall require evidence to
show the true market value of the property sold under the powers and shall not confirm
the sale unless it is satisfied that the property so sold brought its true market value on
such foreclosure sale.").
166. Greenwood Homes, 302 Ga. App. at 593, 692 S.E.2d at 45 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 594, 595, 692 S.E.2d at 46. See generally O.C.GA. § 44-14-161(b).

304

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

included discounts for the sale of bulk property in arriving at his opinion
of the property's value.'72 However, in this instance the court of
appeals determined the appraiser's method was proper.1 73 Specifically,
the language of the underlying security deed authorized the lender "to
This language
dispose of the [piroperty in 'one or more sales.'""
provided the rationale for analyzing bulk sale valuations. 75 The
testimony of the appraiser "that '[in all my experience, I have never
seen a sale of an individual town home lot, and the reason for that is
that town homes aren't built individually'" supported the plaintiffs
position."e That testimony was supported by other authority that said
"[O.C.G.A.] § 44-14-161(b) must be read to require proof of true market
value under the usual market conditions for sales of such property."77
The appellant also attacked the appraiser's discounted cash flow
analysis as conflicting with O.C.GA. § 44-14-161(b) because he applied
a discounted rate and deduction for taxes incurred during the holding
period. 78 Recognizing that the testimony of both parties' appraisers
was "that subdivision lots aren't moving," the court "held that in
determining true market value, a trial court may consider market
conditions in general at the time of the sale under power and the effect
of depressed market conditions on the value of a subject property."17 e
The procedural technicalities of an action to foreclose were reviewed
in Belans v. Bank of America."so Belans appealed from an order
confirming foreclosure of three properties and claimed that the trial
court erred because Belans was not personally served with notice of the
confirmation hearing and the trial court confirmed the sale without
The
receiving evidence of the true market value of the properties.'
evidence at the confirmation hearing was that the lender had retained
two separate special process servers to attempt personal service of the
petitioner for confirmation and rule nisi setting the hearing, but after
over a dozen attempts to serve and over sixty-five hours trying to locate
him, Belans could not be personally served. After these failed attempts
at personal service, the lender applied for and was granted an order

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
S.E.2d
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Greenwood Homes, 302 Ga. App at 594, 692 S.E.2d at 46.
Id. at 595, 692 S.E.2d at 46.
Id. at 594, 692 S.E.2d at 46.
Id.
Id. at 595, 692 S.E.2d at 46 (alteration in original).
Id. (quoting Gutherie v. Ford Equip. Leasing Co., 206 Ga. App. 258, 261, 424
889, 892 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 595, 692 S.E.2d at 46-47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
303 Ga. App. 35, 692 S.E.2d 694 (2010).
Id. at 35, 692 S.E.2d at 694.
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allowing service by publication. The court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err in allowing service by publication because, under
Georgia law, when a party to a confirmation cannot be found after due
diligence, service by publication is sufficient.182
However, there was another problem. Although the appraiser was
present at the hearing and was prepared to testify, because there was
no other party present to object, the trial court allowed the attorney for
the lender to state in his place that the properties had sold at fair
market value. After reviewing the written appraisal reports, the trial
court concluded that the properties were sold at fair market value and
confirmed the foreclosure sales.8 a The court of appeals, although
recognizing that attorneys as officers of the court can make statements
for their client, held that the trial court should have taken testimony
from the appraiser and that the written appraisal reports alone should
not have been the sole basis for a determination of fair market
value." "When the appraisal reports are eliminated from the record,
no evidence remains to support the trial court's determination that the
sales under power brought at least the fair market value."" Therefore, the trial court's confirmation of the foreclosure sale was reversed."s
In Banks v. Echols,"s' the court of appeals reversed the grant of
summary judgment to the purported holder of a note in an action for
judicial foreclosure." The evidence at trial showed that in 1980 Ed
Echols sold real property to Jimmy Banks for $17,500 and conveyed title
to Banks via a warranty deed. To secure repayment of the debt, Banks
executed a security deed in favor of Echols. Banks made payment to
Echols until his death and thereafter made payment to Echols's son, Ted
Echols."as
In 1998 Banks and his wife separated, and as part of the separation
agreement, Banks conveyed the property to his wife, Eunice Banks, who
took over payment of the debt. Shortly after the property was conveyed,
Eunice Banks asked Echols for the loan payoff amount. Echols
responded that no payment had been made from 1986 through 1996, and
he requested copies of Banks' payment records for those years. Banks

182.
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184.
(2005)).
185.
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Id. at 37-38, 692 S.E.2d at 696; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(fx)(1A) (2006).
Belans, 303 Ga. App. at 39, 692 S.E.2d at 697.
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claimed the payments had been made during the period and produced
documents to support her position. Echols continued to maintain that
over $16,000 was due on the mortgage, but he offered to accept that sum
in full payment in exchange for mutual releases. Even though the
parties differed on the state of the loan balance, Eunice Banks continued
to make the monthly mortgage payments, and in June 2000 she sent a
payment and letter to Echols indicating that this was the final payment
due.eo
Echols waited nearly a year before sending Eunice Banks a letter
rejecting and returning the payment, informing her that the balance to
pay off the debt was $17,298 and "that he 'intend[ed] to rely on the exact
terms' of the Security Deed, and would pursue all remedies, including
foreclosure, if she failed to pay the balance within 30 days."' However, the trial record showed "no further correspondence between the
parties until six years later when" in June 2007, Echols filed a lawsuit
seeking a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to payment or
Echols also sought "a special
foreclosure of the secured property."
lien against the property, damages for unjust enrichment, and payment
of attorney fees [and] costs."1" Eunice Banks defended the complaint
on the grounds that the debt was paid in full, but Jimmy Banks failed
to answer the complaint, and a default judgment was entered against
him.1" Echols moved for summary judgment on the basis that the
default judgment against Jimmy Banks entitled Echols to judgment
against Eunice Banks as well. In opposition to the motion, Eunice
Banks provided documents reflecting payment to Echols totaling $28,800
from 1980 to June 2000 and a letter written by Echols that stated the
loan payoff in 1994 was $8,236.44. Eunice Banks also disputed Echols's
The trial court
claim that the debt had not been paid in full.'
granted summary judgment to Echols without a hearing, reasoning that
Eunice Banks's possession was created by virtue of the quitclaim deed
from Jimmy Banks and that there was no disputed issue of material fact
that Jimmy Banks had not paid in full."'
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that when the property was
purchased, Echols retained legal title, and Jimmy Banks was vested in

190. Id.
191. Id. at 773, 691 S.E.2d at 668-69 (alteration in original).
192. Id. at 773, 691 S.E.2d at 669.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 773-74, 691 S.E.2d at 669.
195. Id. at 774, 691 S.E.2d at 669; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (2006); GA. UNIP. SUPER.
CT. R. 6.5.
196. Banks, 302 Ga. App. at 775, 691 S.E.2d at 670.
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equitable title, which he was free to dispose of as he wished."
The
court held that Eunice Banks, as a co-defendant in an action based on
a common deed, was entitled to the opportunity to prove her position
separately from Jimmy Banks's default.'" Eunice Banks also argued
that Echols's acceptance of repeatedly late and irregular payments over
the years created a new quasi-contract to the effect "that Echols could
not insist on strictly enforcing the original terms [of the note and
security deed] without first giving her reasonable notice."' The court
of appeals stated that "[tihe determination of whether a quasi new
contract has been created is ordinarily one for jury resolution.""
Further, a jury question also existed as to whether Echols gave Eunice
Banks reasonable notice, consistent with O.C.G.A.§ 13-4-4,201 of his
intent to strictly enforce the terms of the agreement.20 2
VIII.

CONDEMNATION

In Brunswick Landing, LLC v. Glynn County,m Glynn County
(County) brought a petition to condemn property owned by Brunswick
Landing, LLC (Brunswick Landing) to expand the county jail located
within the city limits of Brunswick, Georgia (City). A special master
denied Brunswick Landing's challenges to the condemnation and entered
an award. The superior court affirmed the award, and the property
owner appealed on the grounds that the County did not prove facts
sufficient to entitle it to condemn the property, the County improperly
used special purpose local options sales tax funds, the resolution
authorizing the condemnation was invalid, and the standard of review
used by the superior court violated equal protection.2 4'
The court of appeals held that because the power of eminent domain
is conferred to the County by the Georgia Constitution, the County does
"not need any enabling legislation granting [it] the power of eminent
domain," but it may condemn the property for any public purpose.205
However, because the property was located within the City, a separate
municipality, "the County must also meet the 'additional restriction' of
demonstrating that the condemnation [was] reasonably necessary for the

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 776, 691 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 776, 691 S.E.2d at 671.
O.C.GA § 13-4-4 (2010).
Banks, 302 Ga. App. at 777, 691 S.E.2d at 671.
301 Ga. App. 288, 687 S.E.2d 271 (2009).
Id. at 288-89, 687 S.E.2d at 273-74.
Id. at 289, 687 S.E.2d at 274.
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The court held that
successful completion of the public purpose."
expansion of the jail was reasonably necessary to maintain the jail
system and affirmed the condemnation.'
The court further held that the county's use of special purpose local
According to O.C.G.A. § 48-8option sales tax funds was proper.'
121(aX1),2 0 such funds must be used exclusively for a specified
210
neo
One of the purposes of the special option tax in this case
purpose.
was for the construction of detention facilities.211 The court rejected
the property owners' argument that the statute prohibits the County's
use of the funds generated by the special option tax because the County
planned to use a substantial portion of the funds for construction of
administrative offices rather than for detention facilities.21 2 The court
reasoned that use of the funds was proper because the expansion of the
detention facility would necessarily require additional administrative
office space due to the increased inmate population that a larger jail
would allow.1 '
The property owner contended that the condemnation was invalid
because the County resolution authorizing the taking of the property
was improper, as it only generally described the expansion and did not
show that the City (in addition to the County) consented to the
The court rejected that
condemnation within its boundaries.21 "
argument, holding that the City's consent was not required for a proper
resolution by the County.1 The County only needed to demonstrate
that the condemnation was reasonably necessary for the completion of
the public purpose for which the property was condemned.2 16
Finally, the court rejected the claim that the trial court should have
applied an abuse of discretion standard instead of the bad faith standard
The court stated that it is well
applied by the special master.1
settled that condemnation cases brought under title 22 of the O.C.G.A. 21" are governed by the bad faith standard. 2 9 The property own-

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 290, 687 S.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 291, 687 S.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 293, 687 S.E.2d at 276.
O.C.G.A. § 48-8-121(aX) (2009).
Brunswick Landing, 301 Ga. App. at 293, 687 S.E.2d at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293, 687 S.E.2d at 277.
Id. at 294, 687 S.E.2d at 277.
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See id. at 290-91, 687 8.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 294, 687 S.E.2d at 277.
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er's constitutional claim also failed because the owner failed to raise the
issue in the trial court.'
In Department of 'hransportationv. Jordan, 1 the court of appeals
reviewed whether future potential zoning restrictions may be considered
to determine the market value of a property to be condemned.' The
facts showed that the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT)
condemned the home the Jordans had owned for thirty years. At the
condemnation hearing, the owner's son testified on behalf of the Jordans
that the property had a value of $480,000. A real estate appraiser
testified that the highest value and best use of the property had three
forms: the value as it was currently developed ($353,250 to $392,500),
the value as cleared for redevelopment ($399,422), and the value as
rezoned for development as residential property ($535,400). The
At
appraiser testified that rezoning was "possible" in this instance.'
trial the DOT moved to strike the appraiser's testimony concerning the
possible value of the property if it were to be rezoned. The trial court
denied the DOTs motions to strike and to remove the word "possible"
from the pattern charge and entered judgment on the jury's condemnaThe DOT claimed on appeal
tion award for $400,000 for Jordan.'
that the testimony should have been excluded because it did not
establish that the rezoning was "probable" and that admitting the
appraiser's testimony of the value of the property if rezoned was an
abuse of the trial court's discretion.2
Affirming the denial of both the DOT's motions to strike the appraiser's testimony and to change the charge to the jury, the court of appeals
held that when there
is a possibility or probability that the zoning restrictions may in the

near future be repealed or amended so as to permit the use in question,
such likelihood may be considered if the prospect of such repeal or
amendment is sufficiently likely as to have an appreciable influence
upon present market value [provided] such possible change in zoning
regulations must not be remote or speculative.'

219. Brunswick Landing, 301 Ga. App. at 294, 687 S.E.2d at 277.
220. Id. at 294-95, 687 S.E.2d at 277-78.
221. 300 Ga. App. 104, 684 S.E.2d 141 (2009).
222. Id. at 104, 684 S.E.2d at 142.
223. Id. at 104-05, 684 S.E.2d at 142.
224. Id. at 105, 684 S.E.2d at 143.
225. See id. at 104-06, 684 S.E.2d at 142-43.
226. Id. at 106, 684 S.E.2d at 143 (alteration in original) (quoting Unified Gov't of
Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Watson, 276 Ga. 276, 276, 577 S.E.2d 769, 770 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Compensation for property taken by the DOT was also the issue in
Department of T)ansportation v. Crowe."' In 2007 the DOT filed a
condemnation action to acquire 1.217 acres out of a 2.807 acre parcel
owned by Walter Crowe and Nelda Crowe Lewis. The taking included
a pond located on the property, which was about one acre in size. The
property owners objected to the DOT's $46,800 appraisal as inadequate
and demanded a jury trial. At trial, a jury determined the value of the
property to be $156,074. The DOT appealed the award on the grounds
that the trial court improperly denied its motion in limine to prevent the
property owners from introducing evidence regarding the cost it would
take to build a new pond on the remaining property.22 8
The court of appeals found no error in the trial court's decision to
allow the property owners to present evidence of the cost to rebuild a
pond, as such costs were "consequential damages resulting from the
taking.'2 9 In order to determine adequate compensation for the
taking of property by a governmental entity like the DOT, two elements
must be considered: "(i) the market value of the portion actually taken
and (ii) the consequential damage, if any, to the remainder.so The
cost of replacing the pond was a cost to cure what the condemnation of
the property had removed (the pond), and although the costs to cure
were not recoverable as a separate element of damage, such costs were
admissible as evidence of consequential damages.21
Additionally, the DOT asked the trial court to instruct the jury that
it could not award the property owners both the value of the land with
the pond upon it and the separate value of the pond. The DOT conceded
that giving the instruction would cure any confusion resulting from
introducing the cost of rebuilding the pond. The trial court gave the
instruction requested. During the trial, the DOT brought to the trial
court's attention that it anticipated that when the property owners'
expert testified, he would state that the cost of replacing the pond should
be awarded as separate damages. After discussion, the trial court
anticipated that it would allow evidence of the cost to replace the pond
to go to the jury but deferred a ruling until there was further discussion
on the issue. However, when the property owners' expert testified, the
DOT failed to raise an objection to the testimony and did not seek a
ruling on its objection to exclude such testimony. Rather, the DOT
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228.
229.
230.
231.

299 Ga. App. 756, 683 S.E.2d 695 (2009).
Id. at 756, 683 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 757, 683 S.E.2d at 696.
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called its own appraiser, who testified that the property owners were not
entitled to any amount related to the rebuilding of the pond. 2 The
court of appeals ruled that because the DOT failed to make an objection
at the time the property owners' expert testified, it had waived the issue
on appeal."
IX.

ZONING

In Cox v. City of Sasser,' the court of appeals reviewed nonconforming uses of property that violated zoning ordinances, in contrast with
provisions in the ordinances that allowed improvements on those same
In 1990 the Coxes placed a 660 square
nonconforming properties.'
foot mobile home on their property in Sasser, Georgia (City), for the use
of Mrs. Cox's elderly parents. Mrs. Cox's parents resided there until the
death of her mother in 1995. It was undisputed among the parties that
in 2002 the City amended its zoning ordinance, and the Cox property
was then rezoned as R-1 single family residential. The amended
ordinance prohibited mobile homes in the zoning district but did not
prohibit modular homes. Further, the zoning ordinance allowed existing
nonconforming residences to make improvements, including replacement,
that could be done without violating the zoning provisions. In April
2006, the City issued the Coxes a permit to place a 2080 square foot
manufactured/modular home on their property. Thereafter, Mr. Cox
purchased a new 1980 square foot mobile home and placed it upon the
property. The City filed suit to enjoin the Coxes from violating the
zoning ordinance by placing the mobile home on the property and sought
an order to compel removal of the mobile home. The Coxes argued that
the newer mobile home was a replacement of the older home and was
authorized under the city ordinance. The trial court disagreed and
granted the city's motions, from which decision the Coxes appealed."'
In confirming the trial court's order, the court of appeals looked at how
the ordinance defined mobile home, manufactured home, and modular
home." The ordinance classified "mobile home" as synonymous with
"manufactured home," stating that "a detached single family dwelling
unit, designed for long-term occupancy, which has been prefabricated
and then transported to its site or to a sales lot usually on its own
wheels and requires only minor work before occupancy such as
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connection to utilities or to a foundation."ne A "modular home" was
defined to be
a factory-fabricated single family dwelling which is constructed in one
or more sections. These units are manufactured in accordance with the
Georgia Industrialized Building Act and the rules of the Department
of Community Affairs issued pursuant thereof. Each unit must bear
a seal of approval by the Commission of DCA.m
It was undisputed that the previous 660 square foot mobile home was
a nonconforming use.o The court also held that the new home was
not a replacement for the original mobile home and was therefore a
violation of the ordinance?" The court distinguished the Coxes
reliance upon Henry v. Cherokee County,2 which referred to a "nonconforming use of a 'lot or parcel of land,'" from the issues of this case,
which concerned "non-conforming residences."'
In U.S.A. Gas, Inc. v. Whitfield County,' Whitfield County, Georgia
(County), brought an action against the defendant gas company and its
owners seeking a declaratory judgment from the trial court that the gas
company and property owners had vested rights in the continued and
alleged nonconforming use of a 30,000 gallon liquefied petroleum gas
tank. The trial court ordered that the tank be removed from the
County's property because the County's zoning ordinance barred the
installation and use of the gas tank, and the license issued to the gas
company by the safety fire commissioner did not create a vested right in
the defendants to use the tank. The gas company and owners appealed.2 45
In 1994 the State of Georgia's safety fire commissioner verified the gas
company's plan to construct a gas tank on the county's property
contingent on the completion of a required fire safety analysis. The
Whitfield County Fire Department conducted a safety analysis of the
tank in 1995, finding that it was located in a heavily populated area and

that an explosion at the site could be catastrophic.'

Based on that

finding, the safety fire commissioner initially refused the gas company's
application for a liquefied petroleum gas facility license, but in 2003 the
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commissioner issued a license to the gas company to store and distribute
liquefied petroleum."' After concerned neighbors demanded enforcement of the existing zoning regulations, the County filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment on the grounds that it was empowered to challenge
the use and operation of the tank by virtue of the violation of zoning
ordinance. Intervening in the action was Stephan Fromm, a neighboring
property owner who opposed the installation and use of the gas tank.
The gas company defended the suit on the ground that the County had
not objected when the gas company received approval for the tank, and
based upon that approval, the gas company incurred substantial
expenses to make the structure compliant with the law. The trial court
granted the County's request for declaratory judgment, finding that the
property where the tank sat was not zoned for such use.'
Much of the court of appeals opinion concerned procedures under
Georgia's Declaratory Judgment Act," particularly whether the
county was entitled to declaratory relief after it initially failed to oppose
The court
the installation of the gas tank and its use thereafter.'
First, the
two
reasons."
for
was
just
held that declaratory relief
the
defendant's,
to
adverse
were
neighbor, Fromm, whose interests
opposed the installation and use of the gas tank from the beginning.?2
Second, the County was in jeopardy of facing multiple suits from
neighbors of the property if it failed to enforce its zoning ordinances."
The court noted that "[blecause there was a bona fide dispute over the
applicability of the County's zoning ordinance and over whether the
defendants had vested rights to use the tank, and since the County was
in a position of uncertainty as to its legal rights, a declaratory judgment
was authorized."'
In Camden County v. Lewis,' Camden County, Georgia (County),
erroneously issued a building permit and a certificate of occupancy for
the construction of a seafood business owned by Lewis. Lewis first
applied for and received a building permit for an open shed. Later that
day, however, he decided to enlarge the building, so he applied for and
received a permit for an 800 square foot commercial outbuilding. Lewis
also applied for a septic permit indicating that he was constructing a live
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bait shop. Subsequently, the County determined that the permit for the
larger structure was improper because it violated the County's electrical,
plumbing, and zoning ordinances. Based on those violations, the county
issued a stop work order. In response, Lewis sought a writ of mandamus
against the County to revoke the stop work order on the grounds that
his constitutional due process and equal protection rights were violated
and that he detrimentally relied upon the County's issuance of the
building permit, which resulted in lost profits and other damages. The
County was denied summary judgment when the trial court found that
there were genuine issues of material fact as to Lewis's claims. The
County appealed.'
The court of appeals held that one cannot detrimentally rely on the
government's issuance of a permit when it is issued in violation of an
ordinance law because the permit is void from the beginning and cannot
confer rights upon the holder of the permit.2 7 The court also noted
that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy cannot be construed as an
approved exception to code violations or violation of other ordinances.2
Buckler v. Dekalb County Board of Commissioners" concerns the
standard of review applicable to issues regarding ordinances that protect
The Georgia General Assembly adopted the
historic districts.'
Georgia Historic Preservation Act (HPA)261 to create uniform procedures for counties and municipalities in protecting historic districts.m
Here, developers argued that Dekalb County, Georgia (County), had
failed to properly comply with the HPA when it designated a certain
area as an historic district. The developers argued that the County's
denial of their request to use their property was inconsistent with the
provisions of the historic district designation and therefore violated their
constitutional rights. The trial court denied the developers' motion for
partial summary judgment, finding that the County substantially
complied with the provisions of the HPA. The developers appealed,
contending that the appropriate standard to determine whether the

256. Id. at 594-95, 680 S.E.2d at 623.
257. Id. at 597-98,680 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Union County v. CGP, Inc., 277 Ga. 349,
351, 589 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2003)).
258. Id. at 598, 680 S.E.2d at 625.
259. 299 Ga. App. 465, 683 S.E.2d 22 (2009).
260. See id. at 465, 683 S.E.2d at 24.
261. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-10-20 to -31 (2002).
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County's actions were proper was that of "strict compliance."m The
court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision.2'
The court of appeals reviewed O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(c),m which states
that "substantial compliance with any statutory requirement, especially
on the part of public officers, shall be deemed and held sufficient, and no
proceeding shall be declared void for want of such compliance, unless
The HPA does not mandate a strict
expressly so provided by law."
compliance standard; therefore, it was not error for the trial court to
apply the lesser "substantial compliance" standard. 267 Applying that
standard, "the [trial] court found that the evidence presented showed
that the [Clounty had, in fact, substantially complied with the applicable
statutory requirements" of the HPA at the time it enacted the ordinance
designating the historic district.'
The developers also complained that the County had not complied with
the HPA for the following reasons: "the [C]ounty failed to have the
appropriate official execute a final version of the ordinance which
designated the historic district, failed to show the historic district's
boundaries on the [Clounty's official zoning map, failed to mail notices
to all property owners, and failed to list the names of all property
owners in the ordinance. 26
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals looked to the Dekalb
County Board of Commissioners' records.2 0 Although the County had
been unable to produce a copy of the ordinance designating the historic
district, which would show execution on the part of the County's chief
executive officer, the County relied upon "[slection 15(b) of the DeKalb
County Organizational Act [which] provides that, '[ilf the chief executive
does not approve or veto an ordinance or resolution within eight (8)
business days after its adoption by the commission, it shall become
effective without the chief executive's approval.'"2 71 The County could
neither affirmatively show that its CEO signed the resolution nor show
that the CEO vetoed the redesignation.27 2 Based on the evidence, the

263. Buckler, 299 Ga. App. at 465-66, 683 S.E.2d at 24.
264. Id. at 465, 683 S.E.2d at 24.
265. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(c) (2000).
266. Buckler, 299 Ga. App. at 466,683 S.E.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(c).
267. Buckler, 299 Ga. App. at 467, 683 S.E.2d at 25.
268. Id. at 466, 683 S.E.2d at 24.
269. Id. at 467, 683 S.E.2d at 25 (footnotes omitted).
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court held that the ordinance was valid. 3 As to the constitutional
arguments made by the developers, because the property was designated
as part of an historic district at the time it was purchased, the developers could not show that their constitutional right of due process was
denied or that they were harmed by the alleged notice deficiencies in
2000.274

273. Id.
274. Id.

